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STATUTE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
Utah Code Annotated,g. 49-10-24:
Options of terminating employee -- Withdrawal of
accumulated contributions -- Inactive membership.
If a member shall for any cause, except retirement,
permanent or temporary disability or death, cease
to be employed in covered services for an employer
he may:
(a) By written request directed to the retirement
office receive a refund of all his accumulated contributions,
less a withdrawal fee the amount of which the retirement board
shall establish by regulation for the purpose of reimbursing
its administrative fund for the cost entailed by said withdrawal. In the event of such election, a terminating employee
upon later re-employment by an employer under the provisions
of this act, unless he redeposits his refund as herein permitted,
shall be treated as a new employee and his service history and
benefit rights shall then be based upon current services from
the date of said re-employment in covered services.
(b) Leave his account in the fund intact. In the
event of such election, a terminating employee shall retain
status as a member of the system, excepting for lack of contributions paid into the fund by him or on his behalf. In the
event of his re-employment by an employer for services covered
by this act, his service history and benefit rights shall be
based upon the prior service credit and current service credit
accredited to him at the time of his most recent termination of
employment, as well as upon the current service credit that he
acquires as the result of his re-employment.
Upon the attainment of retirement age, an active member
shall have the same rights to receive retirement benefits, if
eligible therefor, as any active employee member.
(iii)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is the position of the Retirement respondents that
49-10-24, U.C.A. 1953, as amended clearly applies by its terms to the
individual plaintiffs and that it prohibits the granting of the relief
sought by these individuals.

The referenced statute provides in no

uncertain terms that whenever a member of the Retirement System ceases
"for any cause11 other than those provided for in the Retirement Act
itself, i.e.; retirement, disability or death, to perform "Covered
Services" that person's options are as provided in subsection (a) and
(b) of the statute.

I

The individual plaintiffs seek to apply the rules and interpretations of private defined contribution plans to a public defined
benefit plan in contravention of the law establishing it.
Section 2 of Title 49, Chapter 10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
is clear on its face.

Prior interpretations of retirement law by this

Court, and particularly, Donald Bryson and Russell Nebeker, et ajL^, v.
Utah State Retirement Office, a Utah State Agency, 573 P 2 1280, are
controlling on this issue.

The legislature must have acknowledged power

to determine the type of retirement plan which it will approve for
public employees and the concomitant authority to determine the law and
procedure under which it will operate.
Equity as well as law favors the decision of the Court below.
Although attempts are made to assert a principle of unjust enrichment,it
is clear from the facts on their face that the remaining employees under

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the system will be called upon to subsidize the approximately 49
employees of plaintiffs employers who have or will retire from the
system.

(R - 128- 130 and unnumbered affidavit of Robert Drisko)
Under the law of the jurisdictions which allow employer unit

withdrawal for any reason other than loss of public funding, Payson City
Hospital would have been required to reimburse the Retirement Board when
it went private.
To accede to the individual plaintiffs demands in this case
would reverse the whole history of public defined benefit retirement
plans and open a Pandora's Box of consequences.

Private defined

contribution plan law is simply not relevant to this issue.

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Utah State Retirement Defendant-Respondents take no
serious issue with the STATEMENT OF THE CASE and the STATEMENT OF
FACTS presented by Plaintiffs-Appellants in their brief except in
some instances the emphasis and interpretation drawn therefrom.
Their assumptions both of law and fact are deemed erroneous and will
be dealt with hereafter in detail.

A R G U M E N T
I.

THE LAW PLAINLY AND SPECIFICALLY DENIES THE RELIEF
SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND COMMANDS THE JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT BELOW.

The sole issue of this case is the liability of the Retirement
defendants to pay as "refund" the employer contribution to individuals
who have ceased to perform "Covered Services" for an employer under
the Utah State Retirement Act.

Erroneous and statutorily unathorized

assumptions must be made in order for that question even to be raised.
First it must be recognized that we are here concerned with
the implementation of a public retirement system, created and governed
by legislative authority and not by "negotiation" and "contract" as in
private systems.

Thus, it is pointless to spend time examining the

laws, rules, or procedures governing private systems.

These two are

clearly noncomparable at this point, and legal and equitable rules
cannot be used interchangeably.

Thus, we will not attempt to

distinquish or otherwise attack the legal sanctity of the private
cases upon which the plaintiffs-appellants rely.
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In public retirement systems in the several jurisdictions of
the United States, there are two distinct types of plans.

Each has

its own advantage and disadvantages to both employers and employees,
but once adopted by the authorized legislative body the rules of one
cannot be applied to the other to vary its application.

This is

exactly what plaintiffs seek to do.
Briefly, a DEFINED CONTRIBUTION plan may be considered to
require specified contributions from the employer and/or the employee
which vests in the employee either immediately or at a specified subsequent date.

The contributions and interest, wherever and however

invested, are deemed to be the property of the employee after vesting
and may be withdrawn in full upon termination of employment with the
participating employer.

In fact, the employee assumes all investment

risk and may theoretically have nothing either at retirement or termination of covered employment.

This system is, in essence, a savings and

investment plan and not a retirement plan as such.
Conversely, a DEFINED BENEFIT plan places all the investment
risk upon the employer.

When the employee attains the age and years

of service specified in law he is entitled to a specified monthly
retirement benefit for life, based on those years and age and a set
percentage formula without reference to the actual funds oaid in or
the success, or otherwise, of the investments made by trustees.
the employees rights vis-a-vis retirement "vest11 at a statutorily

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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While

established point (4 years, 10 years, etc.), this vesting relates only
to retirement and has no reference to receipt of employer or, indeed,
employee contributions upon termination, except as provided in the
enabling legislation.

Without exception, public defined benefit

plans prohibit the payment to individual employees of the employer
contribution except under the purposes specified in the enabling
legislative enactment - the law.
Utah adopted in 1961 (Laws of Utah, 1961, Chapter 100) and is
now operating a DEFINED BENEFIT plan.

It is, therefore, not surprising

that the law governing this action, 49-10-24, U.C.A. 1953, as amended,

I

specifies the payment to an employee of only M s contributions if he so

*

elects upon his ceasing to "be employed in covered services for an
employer."
It is difficult to imagine specific language more to the
point than is the section in controversy when it says:
If a member shall for an^ cause, except retirement,
permanent or temporary disability or death, cease
to be employed in covered services for an employer
he may: (emphasis added)
There follows the option of receiving a refund of his contributions
(which has been interpreted to include interest at the assumed rate) or
leaving the money in and later receiving a retirement benerit earned, if
and when qualified.
Retirement, permanent or temporary disability and death are
the statutory "benefits'1 provided by the law.

Since the defined

benefit plan is not a savings account for an individual employee (as

-DDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a defined contribution plan may be considered to be), early termination
refund is not considered to be a "benefit" under the law.
On the facts and the law it is difficult to understand why
the plaintiffs persist in arguing that section 24 does not apply to
them and that the legislature did not consider their case.

While it

is true that the legislature, in enacting section 24, did not itemize
"other causes," it did specifically state "for any cause" other than
the specified benefits of the plan.

Can it really be argued that

unless legislation specifies a particular set of circumstances it may
not deal with such in a broad, general, exclusive way?

This would

indeed be a novel approach to statutory construction.
It is scarcely arguable that the plaintiffs-appellants have
ceased "to be employed in covered services

"

And certainly, it is

for some cause (any cause) except retirement, permanent or temporary
disability or death.

Thus, it is squarely within the terms of the law

and the options are clear.
While the law is deemed remarkably clear as heretofore suggested, it is significant that in 1983 under legislation termed
"clarifying legislative intent" the legislature, in enacting Senate
Bill 327, specified that section 24 would be applicable in the event
a unit were to withdraw with retirement board approval for loss of
public funding.

Since that language is intended to be clarifying

but, even more clearly because it does not alter the law in any real
degree as it existed in section 24, this cannot be reasonably argued
to be prohibitive retroactive legislation.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is significant that if this Court were to reverse the
lower court and grant the relief urged by the plaintiffs-appellants,
it would be a direct reversal of the law in this jurisdiction and in
every other jurisdiction in these United States (where it was followed)
as it relates to public defined benefit plans.
The actuarial rate is determined and the employer-employee
contributions fixed in a defined benefit plan upon the assumption
that the employer contribution is in all cases, other than to receive
the benefits of the plan, nonrefundable. (R - 128 - 130 and unnumbered
affidavit of Robert Drisko P. 3 - no objection)

Thus, the mischief

inevitably resulting from judicial reinterpretations of this well
established and, indeed, fundamental rule must be incalculable.

*
The

whole funding base would have to be reconsidered and recalculated.
Plaintiffs-appellants would have us believe that theirs is
a unique situation and we can accede to their demands without opening
Pandora's Box.

This is demonstrably untrue.

Payson City Hospital was

not the first, nor the last, to go private, and it is difficult to
understand why they would argue that a reinterpretation of this basic
rule of public defined benefit plans should apply only to them.
This Court has heretofore followed a long line of decisions
on the subject of refunds to terminating employees.
case of first impression.

This is not a

Until recently the public safety and

firemen's systems provided for the refund to terminating employees
of only 80% of their contributions.

It is suggested that the sustain-

ing of such a law must put to rest the question of refunding employer
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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contributions.

The Retirement defendants asked the court to sustain

that law and in doing so to reverse the lower court in Weber County,
which it did in Donald Bryson and Russell Nebeker, et aj_, y^ Utah State
Retirement Office, a Utah State Agency, 573 P 2 1280.

With refer-

ence to refund the Court said, in a unanimous decision:
The obligation to return contributions to employees
who terminate is an important cost factor in operating a retirement system. It is to be realized that
the retention of a percentage helps to pay the cost
of its maintenance and operation. This tends to
keep the system solvent and better able to pay
pensions to those who serve until retirement, all
of which contributes to making it a better system.
It is respectfully argued that this decision is controlling
in this case, dealing as it does with a percentage of employee contributions not refundable.

Under a public defined benefit plan the

employer contribution has neyer

in any jurisdiction in the United

States been deemed to have ever become the "property" of the employee.
A rule sustaining refundability of less than the whole of an employee's
own contributions must certainly apply with much greater force,
therefore, to funds which were neyer

deemed his nor payable to

him under any circumstances, except as provided in the plan.
We have been unable to locate a single case in which a court
of this or any sister jurisdiction has ordered the payment to a terminating employee (or one who ceases to perform "covered service" for an
employer) of more than the amount specified in the law.

Contrarily,

the following courts have sustained the law of the several jurisdictions, even disallowing a refund of any sums at all where the law so
provided:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Kodish v^ Pub Iic Employees Retirement Board, 341 NE^
320 (Ohio, 1975) - only the principal of his own
contributions; Billings v^ City of Orlando 287 S 2
316 (Florida, 1973) - only 50% of sums deducted from
their salaries; and Wi "i 1 iams v^ Schrunk, 527 P^l
(1974); Holmes v. City of Los' Angeles, 172 Cal Rptr.
585 (1981); Rob bins v_^ Police Pension Fund, 32 F.
Supp. 93 (1970): Duff v^ City of Gardena, 167 Cal
Rptr. 4 (1980): Stevens v^ Board of Trustees erf the
Police Pension Fund of th£ City of Shreveport, 370
S^ 528 (1979); and Muzquiz v^ City erf San Antonio,
520 F 2 993 (1975) all of which- later cases allowed
the plaintiffs to recover nothing of even their own
contributions in face of a statute to the contrary.
It is respectfully suggested that plaintiffs here as elsewhere
I

may recover only the amounts or proportions of their own contributions
specified in the law and none of the employer contribution except as
provided by law.

It is further suggested that both statutory and con-

trolling case law in this jurisdiction clearly and emphatically denies
the relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants ana requires tne sustaining
of the judgment of the lower court.

II.

NO UTAH STATUTE OR CASE CAN REASONABLY BE INTERPRETED
TO AUTHORIZE THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS.

Because plaintiffs have sought to sustain their theory by
appeal to several Utah Cases dealing with public retirement, it is
deemed appropriate to canvass their cases.

Let it be stated at the

outset that the Retirement defendants do not take issue with the
specific holding of any of their cases and asserts that they are
simply not apropos to the issue here, which is controlled by Bryson
and Nebeker, supra.

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In ruling as the Court did in Hansen v^ Public Employees
Retirement System Board of Administrators, 246 P 2 591, it upheld
the power and authority of the legislature.

This case involved the

termination of the public plan then mandated by federal law in order
to secure Social Security

coverage.

It is significant that this case

deals with a terminating plan, not a continuing plan.

The legislature

broadened the eligibility of certain classes to obtain "vesting" specifically because of the termination.

But while permitting a broadened

class (not al1 employees) to obtain some otherwise prohibited benefit
from the employer contributions, the legislature did not authorize, in
any case, the payment of such contributions to individual employees.
Some did not have service credit to obtain even this broadened participation.

The legislature drew the lines and the court sustained them.

Those who were within certain well defined lines could elect to either
take a refund of their own contributions, qjr obtain a paid up annuity
using both the employer and employee contributions.

Since this was a

terminating plan, the logic of this case is compelling both legislatively and judicially but, attempting to apply it to the facts of this case
is like building a bridge across the Pacific Ocean from California to
Japan.

It is totally impractical.
Similarly, we have no argument with the holding of either

Driggs v^ Utah State Teachers Retirement Board 142 P 2 6.57, or Newcombe
v^ Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement Commission, 243 P 2 941.

-10-
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In the former case, we insist that members do have "inchoate contractual
rights, which upon completion of conditions precedent to retirement and
actual retirement, ripen into vested rights."

The trouble here is that

as a result of no fault on the part of these retirement defendants,
the plaintiffs did not, in fact, complete the conditions precedent.
Nor do we take issue with Newcombe, that "the right to a
pension becomes so much a part of the agreed compensation for the
service of the employee as the monthly stipend, but it is deferred in
payment until after his retirement."

But the employee must qualify

under the terms of the contract, which these plaintiffs have demon-

f

strably failed to do.

?

Thus, the legislature has both a right and a

duty to otherwise provide, which it has in section 24.
If these plaintiffs have a justifiable complaint it is
against the City of Payson and/or the Payson City Hospital . . .
not these defendants.

The issue of whether or not these entities are

indispensable parties has no bearing on that factual situation.
Plaintiffs have presented all the classic arguments favoring
in the beginning the adoption of a defined contribution plan for
public employees.

But, since our legislature opted to establish a

defined benefit plan instead, those arguments are both too late and
too little.
The legislature placed responsibility upon each member "to
acquaint himself with his rights and obligations as a member of the

-11-
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system.1'

49-10-49, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.

Since the system does

not contemplate the payment to a terminating member "for any cause" of
the employer contributions, but contrarily, has built into the actuarial
base a percentage of employer contributions not paid out and thus
available to retirees, this should in all conscience settle the issue.
Plaintiffs' reference to 49-10-7, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, in
aid of their cause is sadly miscited since that statute militates
strongly against them.

When the legislature stated "It is hereby

declared to be the policy of the legislature that this act be liberally
construed sc) that the benefits and protections as herein provided shal 1 i
be extended <as broadly as reasonably possib1e(.),"

(emphasis added)

It cannot reasbnably be interpreted to intend benefits exactly opposite
to those "herein provided" as plaintiffs seek here.

The benefits are

as already established by the legislature to be retirement, normal or
disability, and death benefits arid nothing else.

Certainly not a

savings account via payment of employer contributions.
III. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES MAY NOT BE APPLIED TO DEFEAT CLEAR
STATUTORY TERMS, NOR DOES EQUITY AID PLAINTIFFS.
Plaintiffs continue to urge some principle of unjust enrichment as an aid to their cause, thus appealing to principles of equity.
It is axiomatic that he who seeks equity must do equity.

Nowhere in

the pleadings or arguments of plaintiffs do they recognize the liability which the Retirement defendants have been required to assume for
-12-
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the employees of plaintiffs' employer, Payson City Hospital, who had
previously retired or who elected, as noted in Appellant's brief at
page 9, to take an early retirement or to leave their contributions in
for a later retirement upon qualification.

The records of the

Retirement Office disclose that some 33 persons had retired from
Payson City Hospital prior to the events here involved, together with
the 10 who chose to leave their contributions in for later retirement,
and the 6 who chose early retirement (R - 128 - 130). There is then a
total of approximately 49 persons from Payson City Hospital whose
retirement must be funded.

Under a defined contribution program it

would be immaterial, but under the defined benefit plan of this State
it is highly significant.

Is it equitable to shift the financial

responsibility for all these retirees to the other members while these
plaintiffs claim benefits beyond and above the law?

This is a perfect

example of the continuing effort of these plaintiffs to apply the rules
of a defined contribution plan to a defined benefit plan in clear contravention of existing law, both statutory and judicial.
There are defined benefit plans in the public sector which
are more liberal in permitting employer unit withdrawal.
and Montana plans are cases in point.

The California

However, there is not a single

public defined benefit plan which permits the payment of arr^ portion
of the employer contributions to employees in the event of such unit
withdrawal.

No statute and no judicial action has ever countenanced
-13-
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*

the relief sought by these plaintiffs.
their aid in clear contravention of law?

How then does equity come to
Equity may be invoked where

the law is silent, not; in direct contravention of statutory mandate.
Further, plaintiffs have ignored the fact that each of them
has received some benefit from their participation in the State
Retirement System.

In the event any of them had incurred a covered

disability or had died during retirement coverage, a benefit under the
plan would have been payable.

The costs of this coverage are not

acknowledged anywhere by plaintiffs, although this cost is attributable
to them.
NE

2

See Kodish y^ Public Employees Retirement Board, op cit, 341

320 (Ohio 1975).

*

Plaintiffs do not come before this Court with clean hands
and may not invoke equity thusly.
Is it assumed that the funds of Payson City Hospital and its
employees were managed and invested over a period in excess of fifteen
years without cost and expense?

I

While unacknowledged by plaintiffs,

it needs no proof that costs were incurred.
The foregoing all goes to establish the rational difference
between defined contribution and defined benefit public plans and why
the legislature was not insensitive or irrational in denying payment
of employer contributions to employees no longer in "Covered Services."

-14-
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Neither law nor equity is of aid to these plaintiffs as they seek to
recover sums universally denied public employees under defined benefit
plans in the jurisdictions of the United States.

S U M M A R Y
it is respectfully urged that legislative statement of law
and policy and the prior decisions of this Court sustain the judgment
of the lower court and the action of the Utah State Retirement Board
in refusing to pay over to plaintiffs all or any part of the employer
contributions of Payson City Hospital.

The judgment of the lower court

should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

)a^A^

larlt A. Madsen

K:

Atyorney for Defendant-Respondent
Utah State Retirement Office
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